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Abstract
BANZKP is the best to date Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) based secure lightweight and energy efficient
authentication scheme designed for Wireless Area Network (WBAN). It is vulnerable to several security
attacks such as the replay attack, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks at sink and redundancy
information crack. However, BANZKP needs an end-to-end authentication which is not compliant with the
human body postural mobility. We propose a new scheme BAN-GZKP. Our scheme improves both the security
and postural mobility resilience of BANZKP. Moreover, BAN-GZKP uses only a three-phase authentication
which is optimal in the class of ZKP protocols. To fix the security vulnerabilities of BANZKP, BAN-GZKP uses
a novel random key allocation and a Hop-by-Hop authentication definition. We further prove the reliability
of our scheme to various attacks including those to which BANZKP is vulnerable. Furthermore, via extensive
simulations we prove that our scheme, BAN-GZKP, outperforms BANZKP in terms of reliability to human
body postural mobility for various network parameters (end-to-end delay, number of packets exchanged in the
network, number of transmissions). We compared both schemes using representative convergecast strategies
with various transmission rates and human postural mobility. Finally, it is important to mention that BAN-
GZKP has no additional cost compared to BANZKP in terms memory, computational complexity or energy
consumption.
Keywords: Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN), Mobile and wireless security, Network performance
analysis, Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP)
1. Introduction
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBAN) is a spe-
cial kind of Wireless Sensors Networks (WSN). In
WBAN, networked body sensors collect user’s physio-
logical data and transmit them to a sink node. There
is a tremendous difference between WBAN and clas-
sical WSN. In WBAN nodes are distributed on/in
human body and, similar to the Delay-Tolerance Net-
works (DTN), move with the human postural mobil-
ity [1], [2]. Because of that, the network topology in
Intra-WBAN dynamically changes following the pos-
tural body mobility. In a recent work related to chan-
nel modes for WBAN [3] the authors advocate for the
use of multi-hops communication in WBAN.
IAn extended abstract of this paper appeared in IEEE 14th
International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Sys-
tems (MASS), 2017
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Multi-hop WBAN communication schemes easily
adapt to postural mobility where nodes and links are
highly dynamic [3]. Also, multi-hop communications
need lower transmission power compared to one-hop
direct communication where source nodes have to use
enough transmission power in order to make sure that
their messages can reach the sink directly. Moreover,
lower transmission powers automatically reduce the
radio radiation of the human body, which became an
important issue today [3].
However, multi-hop communication in WBAN is
vulnerable to security and privacy attacks. Any med-
ical data error, leakage or imitation may lead to a
wrong medical treatment. The disclosure of critical
health information can also have irreversible conse-
quences on the patients daily life. Security mech-
anisms are thus needed in WBAN to protect user’s
data from malicious eavesdropping, tampering or abu-
se.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier February 21, 2018
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Recently, the literature investigated Inter-WBANs
security. As examples, [4], [5] and [6] discuss the se-
curity mechanism for communications from the sink
to the remote Health Centre (hospitals or online doc-
tors). In this context the security of the Intra-WBAN
communication should also be carefully considered:
date leakage or tampering of source nodes from Intra-
WBAN area leads to a meaningless subsequent Inter-
WBAN security protection.
The challenges of Intra-WBAN security are three-
fold:
• The computing capacity of WBAN devices is
limited. Traditional encryption and decryption
algorithms used for personal computers or mo-
bile phones may be not applicable as they are
to the WBAN devices.
• Poor storage of WBAN devices may not be able
to store too much shared content to make ef-
fective the recent complex authentication and
security protocols.
• Control message exchanges may lead to poor
applicative performances.
Related Works. The most basic encryption mecha-
nism, symmetric encryption, uses the same secret key
to encrypt and decrypt data. As symmetric key can
be directly used in Stream cipher or Block cipher,
the coding speed and its efficiency are very competi-
tive. However, in symmetric encryption, by using the
all-networks-widely fixed key, if one node has been
compromised, the secret key will be known by adver-
sary who can then monitor the entire networks. Also,
symmetric encryption suffers from replay attack due
to the use of the same encryption key. Some improve-
ment solutions come out to solve the replay attack
problem. One example is MiniSec [7]. Without us-
ing the same key, MiniSec uses data sequence as a
part of encryption key. However, MiniSec needs to
synchronize sequences of packets when the number of
missing messages is important. This is often the case
in a WBAN environment. Also MiniSec suffers from
DDoS attack at the sink, since MiniSec doesn’t force a
hop-by-hop authentication, malicious message traffic
from adversary can deliver to all the network. Other
solutions [8], [9] and [10] come with specified Key
Agreement Mechanism to ensure the key will change
periodically. However, most of works do not mention
the networks performance impact when applied in a
real WBAN environment.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a widely-used
asymmetric encryption, authentication and access co-
ntrol mechanism ([11], [12]). Especially after the in-
troduction of elliptic curve encryption (ECC) mech-
anism [13], which is proved more efficient than tradi-
tional PKI. However, this kind of mechanism needs
an additional Certification Authority (CA) to gen-
erate user certification. ID-based ([14], [15]) or cer-
tificateless based ([16], [17]) mechanisms need also
the Networks Manager (NM) to achieve this security
function, which are not well suitable for Intra-WBAN
communication. Complex parameter assignment and
key management are also the major challenges for
asymmetric encryption in WBAN.
Another trend is the security scheme based on the
physiological signal or channel quality introduced in
[18], [19], [20] and [21]. The nodes can use the col-
lected physiological signals to encrypt and decrypt
messages. However, the processing of these physio-
logical signals needs additional powerful elements to
handle. Because in this case, sensor nodes don’t only
need to store physiological signals as Data, but also
need a further treating of these signals as a part of en-
cryption process. These elements are expensive and
consume additional energy. For example, in [18], to
use Electrocardiography (ECG) signals, it needs addi-
tional device to do Discrete Meyer Wavelet transform
(DWT). Also, the distance, the changing of temper-
ature or the human body mobility can make the col-
lected physiological signals different at two different
nodes.
More recently, in order to respond to the three
challenges of WBAN security, BANZKP [22] and Tin-
yZKP [23] where specifically designed for WBAN and
use ZKP based authentication mechanism.
The best to date ZKP-based scheme, BANZKP
[22], uses less memory to store private secrets and
requires less computing capacity than TinyZKP [23]
and the Elliptic Curve Encryption Based Public Key
Authentication scheme [13]. BANZKP is also re-
silient to a wide range of attacks. However, BANZKP
still suffers from some specific malicious attacks such
as Data Replay attack, DDoS Attack at sink and
Redundancy Information Crack. Moreover, the re-
silience of BANZKP to human body postural mobil-
ity in WBAN environment was left as open question.
Our Contribution. In this paper, based on an exten-
sive analyze of the security weakness of BANZKP we
propose a new ZKP-based scheme that outperforms
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BANZKP from both security and networking point of
view. An extended abstract of this paper appear in
[24]. Our scheme BAN-GZKP is resilient to Data Re-
dundancy Cracking, Data Replay Attack and DDoS
Attack at the sink and optimizes the ZKP exchang-
ing scheme. Furthermore, we stress both BAN-GZKP
and BANZKP schemes face to human body postural
mobility. When these schemes are plugged to con-
vergecast protocols we prove via extensive simula-
tions that for strategies that use BAN-GZKP scheme
outperforms with respect to the case when BANZKP
is used. Additionally, our BAN-GZKP scheme presen-
ts better computational complexity and less energy
consumption than BANZKP while it has the same
memory complexity.
Roadmap. The paper is organised as follows. Section
2 presents and overview of the BANZKP scheme and
discusses its vulnerabilities. Then, Section 3 presents
our new BAN-GZKP, and its security analysis. The
resilience of BANZKP and BAN-GZKP face to hu-
man body postural mobility when BANZKP and
BAN-GZKP are combined with known convergecast
strategies, and theirs performances comparison anal-
ysis are shown in Section 4. We present, finally, a
summary and conclude our work in the Section 5.
2. BANZKP vs Security Attacks
In this section we recall briefly BANZKP [22] (the
best to date ZKP-based scheme designed for WBAN),
then we analyze its vulnerabilities in terms of re-
silience to security attacks.
2.1. BANZKP Overview
BANZKP [22] combines a Zero knowledge Proof
and a Commitment Scheme.
The Zero knowledge Proof scheme ensures bidi-
rectional authentication between two parties (a sender
and a verifier). The idea is by exchanging challenge
and response messages between two parties, they can
finally trust each other that they hold the same secret
information, but none of them sent this secret infor-
mation into the channel during the challenge and re-
sponse phase. The security level is guaranteed by the
fact that it is practically impossible to solve the dis-
crete logarithms for numbers represented on hundreds
of bits [23]. In BANZKP the two parties exchange
five challenge/response messages and never disclose
the shared secret.
The Commitment Scheme ensures that a sender
transmits an encrypted message to a receiver who
does not have the decryption key yet. The key is
transmitted later as soon as the identity of the re-
ceiver is confirmed. In BANZKP, the Commitment
Scheme is transmitted directly in plaintext. Because,
this key is only used to verifier the identity of the
sender and will be used only once per authentication
session. So this key is useless after this session and
will not give any secret information to anyone.
BANZKP between two nodes N1 and N2 executes
the following five steps:
1)N1 > −−−− E(KI [IDN1 ||V p])−−−− > N2
2)N1 < E(KI [IDN2 ||V q||RI]), E(KCS [V p∗qRI ]) < N2
3)N1 > −−−E(KI [IDN1 ||V q∗pRI ])−−−− > N2
4)N1 < −−−−−−KCS −−−−−−−− < N2
5)N1 > −−−E(KI [IDN1 ||DATA])−−− > N2
IDN1 and IDN2 are identities of N1 and N2 re-
spectively; V is the shared secret number; p and q are
two random values generated by N1 and N2, respec-
tively; KI is a shared key between N1 and N2; KCS is
a random key generated by N2 for the Commitment
Scheme and the function E(K[a]) means encrypt a
with key K. RI is the indicator of the beginning of
an interval value of V q∗p, represented by V q∗pRI . In
BANZKP, the size of this interval is 200 bits.
Notice that, V should be a number big enough,
and p and q should also randomly chosen to be big
enough. So that we can make sure the V q∗p has mini-
mal 1096 bits to randomly chose a interval of 200 bits
[22].
During the initialization phase, both participant
nodes store locally a shared secret number V and a
shared key KI by operator (user) manually. Con-
sidering the limited number of the nodes in WBAN,
manual operations is feasible.
During the authentication phase, when a source
node has Data packet to send, an authentication ses-
sion is initiated:
1. N1 initiates the authentication session. It choses
a random value p and computes V p. It then
encrypts his ID and V p by KI and sends the
whole message to N2.
2. Upon reception of V p, N2 generates a random
value q and computes V q and V p∗q. N2 then
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generates a random indicator RI and choses a
200 bits interval value of the V p∗q from the in-
dicator RI, as V p∗qRI (see Figure 1). N2 sends
back to N1: (1) IDN2 , V
q and RI encrypted
by KI ; (2) V
p∗q
RI encrypted by a random chosen
session key KCS .
3. Upon reception of response of N2, N1 computes
V q∗p and uses the received RI to compute V q∗pRI .
N1 then sends his ID and V
q∗p
RI encrypted by
KI to N2. N1 also keeps E(KCS [V
p∗q
RI ]) from
N2 and waits the KCS sent later to verify the
legitimacy of N2.
4. Upon reception of V q∗pRI , N2 compares this value
with his own value, V p∗qRI . If these two values
are equal, then N2 is sure that N1 has the same
shared secret V . Then it confirms the authen-
tication by sending the KCS to N1. Otherwise,
N2 discards the message and closes the session.
5. Upon reception of KCS , N1 decrypts
E(KCS [V
p∗q
RI ]) and compares this value with its
own value, V q∗pRI . If these two values are equal,
N1 is sure that N2 has the same secret V , and
sends ID and DATA encrypted by KI to N2.
Otherwise, N1 discards the message and closes
the session.
BANZKP copes with the following attacks:
• Forge Nodes [22]: Thanks to the bidirectional
authentication, any forge node attempting to
disguise itself in a legitimate node cannot be
certified. This is due to the fact that forge node
has no information on the shared secret. Hence,
it cannot compute the correct authentication
response.
• Replay Attack [22]: Adversary could inter-
cept previous exchanged messages and try to
use them to make other nodes in the networks
trust its identity and finish the bidirectional au-
thentication. The use of randomly chosen p and
q makes each authentication session different
with respect to the previous ones. Hence, old
messages cannot help to correctly execute the
authentication.
• Man in the Middle Attack [22]: In this attack,
the adversary listens channels and try to steal
the shared secret. BANZKP does not send di-
rectly secret information.
Figure 1: Computing V p∗qRI
• Guessing Attack [22]: The use of random val-
ues for q, p and RI makes practically impossi-
ble for the adversary to guess the shared secret
value V from V q∗pRI or V
p∗q
RI .
• Privacy Attack [22]: The adversary may try
to eavesdrop. BANZKP prevents this attack by
encrypting exchanged Data message with KI .
2.2. BANZKP vulnerabilities
In this section we analyze the BANZKP vulnera-
bilities.
Data Replay Attack: BANZKP scheme can pre-
vent malicious authentication message replay by us-
ing the random values q, p and RI. However, for en-
crypting Data message, a constant key KI is used for
all Data message. A conscious adversary may launch
a Data Replay Attack by observing the pattern of the
exchanges. For example, two nodes are exchanging
the authentication messages; an adversary, who holds
a captured previous Data message encrypted by KI
from N1 in previous authentication session between
N1 and N2, is listening the channel. In the phase 4) of
BANZKP, N2 sends the random key, KCS to N1. The
adversary can also receive this key. At this particular
moment, the adversary knows that N2 is, from now
on, waiting for an encrypted Data. The adversary
thus sends immediately the previous captured Data
message to N2 to pretend this expired Data message
as a fresh one. The consequence is that N2 treats the
expired Data message as the right one and ignores
the right message from N1 and allows the adversary
to inject invalid Data into the network.
Redundancy Information Crack: The encryption
in BANZKP uses the stream cipher mechanism where
each bit of collected Data does the exclusive or with
each bit of the encryption key. Since the key used for
4
Data encryption is always the same KI at the end of
each authentication session, Data messages sent by
source nodes have the following format: M1 = Data1
xor KI , M2 = Data2 xor KI ... By capturing M1
and M2, the adversary can do the xor of them to get
redundancy information: M1 xor M2 = Data1 xor
Data2. After getting enough redundancy informa-
tion, encrypted Data could be cracked and from the
Data, KI then will be no longer a secret.
DDoS Attack at Sink: BANZKP was designed to
work for both single-hop and multi-hop WBAN net-
works. In multi-hop WBAN environment, BANZKP
uses relay nodes to forward the source messages to the
sink. From the original BANZKP design, the bidirec-
tional authentication is an end-to-end authentication
between the source node and the sink. Relay nodes
will just forward the messages. Hence all the authen-
tication or Data information is transparent to them.
If an adversary sends continuous invalid authenti-
cation request messages (phase 1 of the BANZKP
scheme), relay nodes will forward these messages to
the sink. The sink will then suffer from a DDoS at-
tack if the amount of the authentication requests is
high. The network resources will be consumed by
these invalid authentication requests and the real au-
thentication messages get thus less chance to reach
the sink.
Potential Adaptation Problem: Intra-WBAN co-
mmunication is affected by high nodes mobility, the
important channel attenuation given by the signal
absorption and the reflection of human body. An
end-to-end authentication may not be efficient when
facing the unstable and high dynamic environments
due to packets loss during the multi-hops transmis-
sion from sources to the sink. Any loss of timeout
during the transmission will lead to the fail of the
whole authentication phase.
3. BAN-GZKP
Original BANZKP scheme shows vulnerabilities
in terms of security and reliable communications. In
this section we present our new BAN-GZKP scheme
that improves over BANZKP in several ways. BAN-
GZKP is resilient to all the attacks supported by
BANZKP plus the Data Replay Attack, Redundancy
Information Crack and DDoS attack at sink. More-
over, BAN-GZKP presents better performances in
terms of percentage of packets received at the sink,
end-to-end delay and the number of transmissions.
BAN-GZKP needs only three phase exchanges which
is optimal in the ZKP class of schemes.
We first present the ingredients that compose our
new BAN-GZKP scheme and analyze its resilience
attack and its complexity in terms of memory and
computation.
3.1. BAN-GZKP Ingredients
In order to tolerate Data Replay Attack, Redun-
dancy Information Crack and DDoS attack at sink
BAN-GZKP uses three ingredients: a random key al-
location, a hop-by-hop authentication and the ZKP
Exchanging Schemes Optimization.
3.1.1. Random Key Allocation
Data Replay Attack and Redundancy Information
Crack are possible in BANZKP because a constant
key KI is used to encrypt all Data messages.
An effective and well adapted key management
mechanism is necessary to generate different encryp-
tion keys for Data messages per session.
The idea of Random Key Allocation is as follows:
when nodes authenticate, the shared secret value V q∗p
will be obligatory computed for each authentication
session. Since p and q are randomly chosen, V q∗p is
also random. During the authentication Phase 4 in
the original BANZKP, N2 will send the random ses-
sion key to N1 to decrypt previous information. No-
tice that, even thoughKCS is random, this key should
not be used to encrypt Data messages because it has
been sent on clear text. Our idea is to use KCS as
a random pointer that will point to a bit in the bi-
nary representation of the random value V q∗p. Then
we chose an interval in the binary representation of
V q∗p that starts with the bit pointed by the random
pointer KCS . This interval, of length KCS can be
seen as a random key, KR, to encrypt Data message
for the current session (see Figure 2).
Our Random Key Allocation does not require ad-
ditional keys at the initialization and does not need
the send of additional fields.
3.1.2. Hop-by-Hop Scheme
Note that Sink-Side DDoS Attack happens in the
end-to-end authentication scheme because relay nodes
cannot detect whether the authentication message is
legal or not. Only the sink can do. To solve this prob-
lem and prevent Sink-Side DDoS Attack, we need to
5
Figure 2: Computing KR, a Random Data encryption Key
provide relay nodes with the capacity to detect in-
valid authentications.
The idea is as follows, instead of doing the authen-
tication between the pair source-sink, we let source
nodes to initiate authentication directly with their
one-hop neighbours. After this authentication phase
finishes with success, a source is allowed to send Data
messages to the authenticated neighbour. The neigh-
bour who receives Data messages can then initiate
authentication with its neighbours until Data reaches
to the sink.
An adversary who wants to initiate a large num-
ber of invalid authentication requests to block the
network will be detected directly by its one-hop neigh-
bours and the DDoS Attack can thus be limited in a
local range.
3.1.3. ZKP Exchanging Scheme Optimization
Original ZKP schemes need five-times continu-
ously message exchanging to achieve a bidirectional
authentication. This scheme could be optimised to
three-times continuously message exchanging under
certain conditions. The reduction of the exchanged
messages could save network resources, and further
improve the total Intra-WBAN performance. The
idea of the optimization proposed for BAN-GZKP is
as follows:
A) For any authentication exchanging between
two nodes who never be authenticated to each other
before, we take exactly the same scheme as the origi-
nal BANZKP to do the bidirectional authentication.
B) When a source node N1 initiates authentica-
tion with another node N2 that previously authenti-
cated with N1 and that recognizes the identity of N1,
we can then optimise the total authentication scheme
to the following:
1)N1 > −−−−−E(KI [IDN1 ||V p])−−−−− > N2
2)N1 < −−E(KI [IDN2 ||V q||RI||R||V p∗qRI ])−− < N2
3)N1 > −−−−E(KR[IDN1 ||DATA])−−−− > N2
When a source node has Data packet to send, an
authentication session is initiated:
1. N1 initiates the authentication session. It choses
a random value p and computes V p. It then en-
crypts its ID and V p by KI and sends the whole
message to N2.
2. N2 recognizes the identity of N1, then N2 in-
stead of sending back E(KI [IDN2 ||V q||RI]),
E(KCS [V
p∗q
RI ]), where V
p∗q
RI is encrypted with
KCS (as in original BANZKP scheme), it sends
back directly V p∗qRI encrypted with the initial
key KI . In our BAN-GZKP N2 needs just to
send a random pointer R for the Random Key
Allocation. Hence, the final message sent back
to N1 is: E(KI [IDN2 ||V q||RI||R||V p∗qRI ]).
3. After receiving the response of N2, N1 finishes
the authentication using the same mechanism,
and choses a random key, KR, from the pointer
R of Random Key Allocation and encrypt Data
by KR then sends the message to N2, if V
p∗q
RI
and V q∗p are equal. We thus can complete the
authentication session after the first successful
authentication between these two nodes. If not,
N1 discards the message and closes the session.
3.2. BAN-GZKP Security Analysis
BAN-GZKP reduces the number of authentica-
tion messages and also tolerates the attacks tolerated
by BANZKP scheme. Additionally it tolerates Data
Replay Attack and Redundancy Information Crack.
As for the case of BANZKP, BAN-GZKP can be im-
plemented either end-to-end or hop-by-hop. Note
that BAN-GZKP hop-by-hop scheme is also resilient
to Sink-Side DDoS Attack.
Inspired by [25], we propose formal security proof
of BAN-GZKP. We first define a node A hold S as
node A known information is:
IA = {S} (1)
Let the operation of sending a message including X
as content of the message from node A to node B at
ith authentication phase is:
A : (A,X,B)i, i ∈ 1, 5 (2)
In BAN-GZKP, for the first time of the authentica-
tion, we need total five authentication phases (each
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authentication message exchange is seen as a authen-
tication phase), but form the second time of the au-
thentication between these two nodes, it’s need only
three authentication phases. Let the Checking op-
eration of a legitimate (honest) node A to verifier a
received message from B is legal or not is:
CheckingA((B,X,A)i) (3)
If message (B,X,A)i can not be decryption correctly
or X can not is not the correct response of previous
challenge, then the Checking operation failed, node
drop the received message. If not, Checking suc-
ceeded, then node continues the next authentication
exchange.
Let’s define a node Z as a smart adversary, who
apply operations as following:
• Z can intercept the message sent form A to B
at any authentication phase.
• Z can initiate an authentication message: Z :
(A,X,B)i where A and B can be any nodes in
the network, and X can be anything belonging
to IZ .
• Z can don’t check any message and confirm ar-
bitrarily that checking failed or succeeded.
• Z can update IZ , when intercepting message.
• Z can try to decrypt encrypted message by us-
ing information from IZ at any time.
In the following, we prove that BAN-GZKP is tol-
erant to the adversary Z defined above.
Proposition 1. BAN-GZKP is resistant to Forge
Nodes Attack.
Proof Let Z is a Forge Nodes attempting to disguise
itself in a legitimate node to authenticate with B.
The initial information of Z and B is:
IZ = {IDZ , IDB,KIZ , VZ , p}
IB = {IDB,KIB , VB}
And following the operations shown below, Z can not
authentication succeed with B.
1) Z : (Z,E(KIZ [IDZ ||V pZ ]), B)1
2) CheckingB((Z,E(KIZ [IDZ ||V pZ ]), B)1)
3) Checking Failed : KIZ 6= KIB
As Z has only information about the ID of B and
itself, Z can not pretend to be a legitimate node, be-
cause the message encryption key KIZ is chosen ar-
bitrarily, B can not decrypted correctly, the checking
will fail. As the sender node will always do the au-
thentication with the receiver node; the receiver node
does also the authentication with sender node only
the first time. In this case, even though the adversary
can disguise itself in a legal node A who previously
finished the authentication with the receiver B. Be-
cause this message sent by this adversary cannot be
decrypted correctly.
Proposition 2. BAN-GZKP is resistant to Authen-
tication Replay Attack.
Proof The proof decomposes in two parts. In the
first parts, let Z intercept a message (A,X,B)1. Then
Z can replay directly this message to disguise itself
in a the node A who previously finished the authen-
tication with B. The initial information of Z and B
are:
IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, (A,X,B)1,KRZ}
IB = {IDA, IDB,KIA = KIB , VA = VB,KRB}
Following the operations shown below, B can de-
tected the message is a replay message.
1) Z : (A,X,B)1
2) CheckingB((A,X,B)1)
3) Checking Succeeded : KIA = KIB , VA = VB
4) B : (B,E(KIB [IDB||V qB||RI||R||V p∗qRI ]), A)2
5) Z intercepts (B,E(KIB [IDB||V qB||RI||R||V p∗qRI ]), A)2
6) Z confirm Checking Succeeded
7) Z : (A,E(KRZ [IDA||DATA]), B)3
8) CheckingB((A,E(KRZ [IDA||DATA]), B)3)
9) Checking Failed : KRZ 6= KRB
Even though B trusts the replay message, the Data
message encrypted with the wrong encryption key
KRZ will be detected by B at the end of the authen-
tication phase.
In the second part, we assume that the adversary
tries to replay the message sent by B in phase 2, and
try to get information from A, the initial information
of Z and A are:
IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, (B,X,A)2}
IA = {IDA, IDB,KIA = KIB , VA = VB}
Following the operations shown below, this message
will directly drop since p chosen by A are different
random values for each session, a replay message can
not pass the checking at A.
1) A : (A,E(KIA [IDA||V pA]), B)1
2) Z intercepts (A,E(KIA [IDA||V pA]), B)1
1) Z : (B,X,A)2
2) CheckingA((B,X,A)2)
3) Checking Failed : V p∗qRI computed from A is
different from V p∗qRI received from X
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Notice that, we cannot simplify the authentication
at A. Otherwise, the adversary can replay the same
message from B, to force A to use the same key KR
to encrypt the Data message. Hence, the adversary
can later initiate a Redundancy Information Crack.
Proposition 3. BAN-GZKP is resistant to Man in
the Middle Attack and Guessing Attack.
Proof Z can intercept messages exchanged between
A and B as a Man in the Middle to try Guessing se-
cret value V hold in A and B, The initial information
of Z is: IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB}
Following the operations shown below, Z can not get
any useful information to decrypt message and Guess
the content of Data message.
1) A : (A,X1, B)1
2) B : (B,X2, A)2
3) A : (A,X3, B)3
...
x) Z update IZ
x+ 1) IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, X1, X2, X3...}
x+ 2) Z try decrypt messages to get V
The attempting of decryption will fail because none of
information in IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, X1, X2, X3...}
contain the secret number V .
Proposition 4. BAN-GZKP is resistant to Data Re-
play Attack.
Proof Z can replay a Data messages from A and
B, and make B think the replay message is correctly
message. The initial information of Z and B are:
IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, (A,X,B)3}
IA = {IDA, IDB,KIA = KIB , VA = VB}
Following the operations shown below, the replay mes-
sage will directly drop. Since in each session, KR is
different, message encrypted by KR computed from
other session can not be decrypted correctly by B:
1) Z : (A,X,B)3
2) CheckingB((A,X,B)3)
3) Checking Failed : KR computed from B can not
decrypt (A,X,B)3
Proposition 5. BAN-GZKP is resistant to Redun-
dancy Information Crack.
Proof Z can intercept encrypted Data messages sent
from A and B, and make try to decrypt Data mes-
sage. The initial information of Z is:
IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB}
Following the operations shown below, Z can not get
Data information from collecting Redundancy Infor-
mation of encrypted Data messages.
1) A : (A,X1, B)3
2) A : (A,X2, B)3
3) A : (A,X3, B)3
...
x) Z update IZ
x+ 1) IZ = {IDZ , IDA, IDB, X1, X2, X3...}
x+ 2) Z try decrypt messages to get V
As Xi is the Data information encrypted by KR and
in each authentication session, KR change randomly.
Z can not get Data information from Redundancy
Information of encrypted Data message.
Proposition 6. BAN-GZKP is resistant to DDoS
attack at sink.
Proof a Z may continue send message into its neigh-
bour node to lance a DDoS attack at the sink by let
neighbour node forwarding these message to the sink.
The initial information of Z and B is:
IZ = {IDZ , IDB}
Following the operations shown below, all the useless
transmission initialed from Z will be blocked at B.
1) Z : (Z,X,B)1
2) CheckingB((Z,X,B)1)
3) Checking Failed : B can not decrypt (Z,X,B)1)
As (Z,X,B)1 failed the checking at B, this message
will be dropped directly. B thus prevent the DDoS
broadcasting into the whole network.
3.3. Memory and Computational Complexity and En-
ergy Consumption
In [22], authors prove that BANZKP improves
over existing similar schemes in terms of memory re-
quirements, computation complexity and energy con-
sumption. In the following we study the costs of
BAN-GZKP compared to BANZKP. In terms of the
parameters required to be stored by each node for
the initial phase, both the end-to-end and hop-by-
hop BAN-GZKP need that source nodes and the sink
store the shared value V and the initial keyKI . Hence,
BAN-GZKP has the same memory complexity as the
original BANZKP.
In terms of computational complexity, a complete
authentication phase in the original BANZKP require-
s four times big number multiplications and five times
encryption/decryption. Our BAN-GZKP scheme re-
quires four times big number multiplications, but only
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three times encryption/decryption. Our scheme pres-
ents a better computation complexity for each com-
plete authentication phase.
In terms of energy consumption, the original
BANZKP needs five transmission phases for a com-
plete authentication. Even though our optimal scheme
sends an additional field, R as a random pointer in
exchange phase number 2), BAN-GZKP needs only
three transmission phases instead of five. The energy
needed to send the R value is hence negligible com-
pared to two complete transmissions of BANZKP.
To sum up, the new BAN-GZKP scheme opti-
mizes BANZKP by adding a Random Key Alloca-
tion mechanisms and a Hop-By-Hop authentication.
Moreover BAN-GZKP has better computational com-
plexity and energy consumption than BANZKP.
4. Analysis of Resilience to Postural Mobility
In the following we analyze the effectiveness of
BANZKP and BAN-GZKP schemes face to postu-
ral mobility. We therefore consider as case study the
convergecast problem where Data messages sent by
source nodes are collected by a specific node in the
network called sink. We enrich representative con-
vergecast strategies specifically designed for multi-
hop WBAN mentioned in [26] and [27] with BANZKP
and BAN-GZKP schemes, respectively. Note that
the original BANZKP scheme requires an end-to-end
authentication where all the authentication messages
are transparent to relay nodes. Only the source and
the sink can understand these messages; BAN-GZKP
is a Hop-By-Hop authentication scheme, where source
nodes initiate authentication with their one hop neigh-
bours. If these nodes are chosen to relay Data mes-
sages then before relaying these messages they apply
the hop-by-hop authentication with their neighbours.
We evaluate the performances of both BANZKP
and BAN-GZKP when these schemes are used in a
secure convergecast process. Our evaluation focuses
the percentage of packets received at sink for various
rates of transmissions and various postural mobilities.
In the next section we briefly present the con-
vergecast strategies we evaluate and the way we plugg-
ed the BANZKP and BAN-GZKP schemes to these
strategies. Then we discuss our simulation results.
4.1. Convergecast Strategies
In [26] and [27], authors classify existing converge-
cast strategies for WBAN into five classes: Multi-
Paths based Strategies, Tree-based Strategy, Dynamic
Path Strategies, Gossip-based Strategies and
Attenuation-based Strategies. In our study we plug
the BANZKP scheme on five different convergecast
strategies (one representative per class).
• Multi-Paths based Strategies: are based on pre-
determined paths and use these overlay paths
as a reliability mechanism. An example is All
Parents to All Parents (APAP) strategy [26].
In APAP, each source node sends a message to
maximum two pre-determined parents. Each
parent then forwards received messages to max-
imum two of their parents.
• Tree-based Strategy: [27] pre-constructs seven
Best-Path Trees for different human postures
shown in Figure 3. Source nodes send mes-
sages through these paths to the sink. The pre-
constructed Best-Path Trees are computed ac-
cording to random attenuation distribution of
each links.
• Dynamic Path Strategies: construct and up-
date a tree-based overlay. The Collection Tree
Protocol (CTP) [28] is an example of this class.
In CTP each node sends additional BEACON
messages to update the overlay route from each
source to the sink.
• Gossip-based Strategies: use flooding. In this
class we choose FloodToSink [26], where a source
diffuses messages to all its neighbours, then con-
tinue to forward messages to all their neigh-
bours and so on. In this case, every packet has
a parameter, Time to Life (TTL), to limit the
number of forwarding.
• Attenuation-based Strategies: these strategies
are based on the negotiation of the channel at-
tenuation. When a source has packets to send,
it broadcasts first a Request (REQ) to ask an
estimate attenuation from the receiver to the
sink. The receiver of the Request will then send
back a Reply (REP) with the required estimate
attenuation value. The source will chose the
next hop among replying nodes and sends data
packets to the chosen one. In this class we in-
vestigate strategy MiniAtt [26]. This strategy
choses one node who has the minimal estimate
attenuation to the sink; if no Reply has been
received for a while, the source will re-send the
Request.
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In our simulations we use five strategies to rep-
resent each class of convergecast strategies: APAP
for Multi-Paths based Strategies; FloodToSink for
Gossip-based Strategies; MiniAtt for Attenuation-ba-
sed Strategies; CTP for Dynamic Path Strategies and
Tree-based Strategy to represent itself.
4.2. How BANZKP and BAN-GZKP plugg to con-
vergecast strategies
We explain in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, how BANZ-
KP and BAN-GZKP schemes can be plugged to the
WBAN convergecast strategies, respectively. The gen-
eral idea is that before each source node sends any
Data packet, it needs to do the authentication with
the sink in the BANZKP or with the next hop in the
BAN-GZKP, respectively.
4.2.1. Convergecast with BANZKP
In the authentication phase of BANZKP, source
nodes need to exchange an authentication message
with the sink. However as original convergecase strate-
gies care about only how to flow authentication mes-
sages and Data messages from source to the sink (up
stream), we need to define how messages flow from
the sink down to the source (down stream). In APAP,
CTP and Tree-based strategies, messages generated
by the sink will follow the opposite route with re-
spect to the up stream exchanges. That is, parents
forward messages to their sons until messages reach
the sources.
For MiniAtt strategy, for both up stream and
down stream, nodes always need from their neigh-
bours attenuation information in order to chose the
next hop. The difference is that for up stream, nodes
ask the attenuation between the receiver and the sink;
for down stream, nodes ask the attenuation informa-
tion between the receiver and the initial source.
For FloodToSink there is no difference between
the up stream and the down stream.
4.2.2. Convergecast with BAN-GZKP
In BAN-GZKP, there is only up stream for Data
from the source to the sink, since nodes only authen-
ticate with their one hop neighbours. After the au-
thentication, nodes send Data messages to the au-
thenticated neighbour. So there is no authentication
flow during the transmission, only the Data message
will be forwarded from the source to the sink as up
stream.
Note that, for APAP and FloodToSink, there is
always a multi-receiver when a source initiates the
authentication. Receivers will reply to the source, the
source then continue the authentication exchanging
with all of them. But only the neighbour who finished
the authentication phase firstly can be chosen as the
legal next hop to avoid additional Data message and
to respect the original convergecast strategy.
For MiniAtt strategy, the BAN-GZKP scheme can
be integrated into the original Attenuation Require-
Response scheme as follows: after a source chooses
the next hop it begins to initiate the authentication
directly with the chosen node.
For CTP and Tree-based strategies, there is only
one parent to forward messages. Hence, the authen-
tication is initiated by nodes with their parents.
4.3. Channel and Human Mobility Model
The WBAN model we used in our research is pro-
posed in [29]. They implement the realistic chan-
nel model proposed in [3] over the physical layer im-
plementation provided by the Mixim framework [30],
who provides several extensions of existing simulation
frameworks specified for wireless and mobility simu-
lation. This channel model of an on-body 2.45GHz
channel between 7 nodes, that belong to the same
WBAN, uses small directional antennas modeled as
if they were 1.5cm away from the body. Nodes are
assumed to be attached to the human body on the
head, chest, upper arm, wrist, navel thigh, and an-
kle. In the convergecast strategies we consider six
source nodes to send Data as follows: 0) navel, 2)
head, 3) upper arm, 4) ankle, 5) thigh and 6) wrist,
and one sink node that collects Data, node 1) chest.
Nodes positions are calculated in 7 postures: walk-
ing (walk), running (run), walking weakly (weak),
sitting down (sit), wearing a jacket (wear), sleeping
(sleep), and lying down (lie). Figure 3 shows the po-
sitions of sensor nodes change with human mobility
human postures within a time period in different pos-
tures model [3]. In each posture, a continuous human
action has been device into many frames. Each sin-
gle human body picture with a corresponding frame
number, x, in a posture is a screenshot of this contin-
uous human action at the xth frame. For example,
in posture 1 Walking, the continuous action takes 30
frame, and in the Figure 3, it shows four screenshots
at 1st frame, 10th frame, 20th frame and the 30th
frame, respectively. The red diamonds in the figures
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represent sensors on the human body moving with
the human mobility.
Channel attenuations are calculated between each
couple of nodes for each of these positions as the av-
erage attenuation (in dB) and the standard deviation
(in dBm). The model takes into account: the shad-
owing, reflection, diffraction, and scattering by body
parts. Naganawa et al. [3] studied a cooperative
transmission scheme: two-hop relaying scheme. Us-
ing the simulated path loss, the performance of such
scheme were evaluated by comparing the outage prob-
ability using different relay nodes against a direct link
between a source and a destination. They advocate
for the use of multi-hops communication which has
the additional feature that it significantly decreases
the transmission power. We thus interested in the
network performance when applying BANZKP and
BAN-GZKP in different multi-hops on-human com-
munications.
4.4. Simulation Results
In order to evaluate the strategies described above
in a realistic WBAN scenario, we implemented them
under the OMNeT++ simulator enriched with the
Mixim project [30] that specifically models the lower
network WBAN layers.
We use standard IEEE 802.15.4 protocol as MAC
layer. Note that the most recent standard
IEEE 802.15.6 proposed for WBAN considers a star
network topology (one hop) and does not take into ac-
count the human body postural mobility. As stressed
in the introduction we focus multi-hop networks and
human body postural mobility.
We consider the following packet rates at the ap-
plication layer: 1 packet/second, 5 packets/second
and 10 packets/second. These values are commonly
used in WBAN [31]. The sensibility of WBAN devices
is -100dBm and the transmission power has been set
to -60dBm. We stress the studied strategies under a
realistic channel model and postural mobility as de-
scribed above.
We evaluated WBAN performance for each stud-
ied convergecast strategy under all seven mobility
postures, in term of ratio of packet reception rate,
data end-to-end delay and also numbers of transmis-
sions plugged with BANZKP and BAN-GZKP, re-
spectively. Figures from 4 to 93 show network perfor-
mance in different strategies. In each figure, the red
columns represent the original convergecast strate-
gies without applying any authentication scheme; the
Figure 3: 7 Different Human Postures [3]
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white columns represent original strategies applying
BANZKP; and the blue columns original strategies
applying BAN-GZKP. The vertical bars of each col-
umn in figures refer to the confidence intervals. Re-
sults computed from 200 runs of simulations observa-
tion samples. The confidence intervals β is calculated
as:
β = t(α,R− 1)  S√
R
(4)
where α is 0.005, means the confidence level is 95%,
R is the number of observation samples and the S is
the standard deviation of observation samples.
For APAP strategy (see Figures from 4 to 24, a
example for posture 1 Walking), by plugging ZKP
scheme into the original APAP strategy, the WBAN
performance decreases in general: lower ratio of pack-
ets reception, higher end-to-end delay and number
of the transmissions, due to the additional ZKP au-
thentication scheme added to the original one. When
focusing on the comparison between BANZKP and
BAN-GZKP, we noticed that BAN-GZKP has higher
ratio of reception, lower end-to-end delay and number
of transmissions in all the postures except the number
of transmissions in the Posture 6 Sleeping, see Figure
23, where BANZKP has fewer number of transmis-
sions than BAN-GZKP. In Posture 6, links between
the nearby nodes to the sink may have important
channel attenuations due to the obstruction and re-
flection of human body when sleeping [27]. Links
who are far away from the sink affected by lower
attenuations comparing with links who are close to
the sink. In the case of the hop-by-hop BAN-GZKP,
data packet has a big chance to be lost when reaching
these links close to the sink. That means BAN-GZKP
may waste all transmissions of hop-by-hop authenti-
cation before the data is finally lost. However in the
BANZKP case, there is no transmission wasted, since
once the authentication packet is lost, after the time-
out, the source node will notice the loss and close
this transmission session. The BANZKP thus is bet-
ter in terms of number of transmissions in Posture 6
Sleeping.
For CTP strategy (see Figures from 25 to 45, a
example for posture 1 Walking), we noticed that the
performance parameters have the same behaviour as
shown in strategy APAP. BAN-GZKP has better per-
formances than BANZKP in terms of ratio of packets
reception, end-to-end delay and number of transmis-
sions except the number of transmissions in Posture
Figure 4: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
1
Figure 5: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
2
Figure 6: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
3
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Figure 7: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
4
Figure 8: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
5
Figure 9: Percentage of received messages for APAP in posture
6
Figure 10: Percentage of received messages for APAP in pos-
ture 7
Figure 11: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 1
Figure 12: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 2
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Figure 13: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 3
Figure 14: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 4
Figure 15: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 5
Figure 16: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 6
Figure 17: End-To-End Delay for APAP in posture 7
Figure 18: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 1
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Figure 19: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 2
Figure 20: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 3
Figure 21: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 4
Figure 22: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 5
Figure 23: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 6
Figure 24: Number of transmissions for APAP in posture 7
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Figure 25: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
1
Figure 26: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
2
6 Sleeping, see Figure 44. The reason is the same as
for the strategy APAP: BAN-GZKP may waste more
transmissions than BANZKP before a packet gets lost
if the link error occurs near the sink. The reason why
BANZKP and BAN-GZKP have the same behaviour
in both CTP and APAP, respectively is as follows:
CTP constructs a tree from each source node to the
sink at the initial phase and keeps updating the tree
during the transmission; APAP on the other side uses
and keeps pre-setted multiple-reception paths. The
common point is that both CTP and APAP tend to
maintain good routes from sources to the sink. When
a node has a packet to send, it can directly send the
packets to an already-keep-in-mid next hop.
For MiniAtt strategy (see Figures from 46 to 66, a
example for posture 1 Walking), we get lower end-to-
end delay and number of transmissions when using
BANZKP and BAN-GZKP than the original Mini-
Att strategy. That is due to the negotiation nature
of MiniAtt strategy: before any transmission, sender
Figure 27: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
3
Figure 28: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
4
Figure 29: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
5
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Figure 30: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
6
Figure 31: Percentage of received messages for CTP in posture
7
Figure 32: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 1
Figure 33: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 2
Figure 34: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 3
Figure 35: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 4
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Figure 36: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 5
Figure 37: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 6
Figure 38: End-To-End Delay for CTP in posture 7
Figure 39: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 1
Figure 40: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 2
Figure 41: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 3
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Figure 42: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 4
Figure 43: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 5
Figure 44: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 6
Figure 45: Number of transmissions for CTP in posture 7
Figure 46: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 1
has to ask around its neighbours, who could have the
smallest attenuation to the sink. That makes data
packets generated by nodes far away from sink need
more time and more transmissions to reach the sink
than data packets generated by nodes close to the
sink. The reception of distant packets extends the av-
erage of end-to-end delay and the average of number
of transmissions comparing with the original strat-
egy. When plugged with the BANZKP and BAN-
GZKP, the additional ZKP message exchange makes
it harder for distant packets to reach the sink. As
the distant packets occurs fewer percentage of the to-
tal packets reception, the average of end-to-end delay
and number of transmissions can thus reduce. When
comparing BANZKP and BAN-GZKP, in the case
of MiniAtt, BAN-GZKP always has better ratio of
packets reception and number of transmissions. Ad-
ditionally it has comparable end-to-end delay in all
the postures.
For FloodToSink strategy (see Figures from 67
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Figure 47: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 2
Figure 48: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 3
Figure 49: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 4
Figure 50: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 5
Figure 51: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 6
Figure 52: Percentage of received messages for MiniAtt in pos-
ture 7
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Figure 53: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 1
Figure 54: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 2
Figure 55: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 3
Figure 56: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 4
Figure 57: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 5
Figure 58: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 6
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Figure 59: End-To-End Delay for MiniAtt in posture 7
Figure 60: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 1
Figure 61: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 2
Figure 62: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 3
Figure 63: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 4
Figure 64: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 5
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Figure 65: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 6
Figure 66: Number of transmissions for MiniAtt in posture 7
Figure 67: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 1
Figure 68: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 2
to 87, a example for posture 1 Walking), in gen-
eral, BAN-GZKP is better than BANZKP, even bet-
ter than original FloodToSink strategy in terms of
number of transmissions. That is because the hop-
by-hop BAN-GZKP can limit the flooding transmis-
sions all over the network. In terms of end-to-end
delay, BANZKP and the original FloodToSink has
varying behaviours in different postures, see Figures
74 and 76: big variance of end-to-end delay, due to its
broadcast nature. In terms of ratio of packets recep-
tion, original FloodToSink is better when using any
ZKP scheme. However the ratio of the packets recep-
tions decreases much faster in the case of BANZKP
and original FloodToSink than in BAN-GZKP who is
relatively stable. That is because with the increase of
the packets generation rate, the number of the pack-
ets sent to the network will increase exponentially
and lead to the network congestion.
For TreeBased strategy (see Figures from 88 to
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Figure 69: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 3
Figure 70: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 4
Figure 71: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 5
Figure 72: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 6
Figure 73: Percentage of received messages for FloodToSink in
posture 7
Figure 74: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 1
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Figure 75: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 2
Figure 76: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 3
Figure 77: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 4
Figure 78: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 5
Figure 79: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 6
Figure 80: End-To-End Delay for FloodToSink in posture 7
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Figure 81: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
1
Figure 82: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
2
Figure 83: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
3
Figure 84: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
4
Figure 85: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
5
Figure 86: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
6
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Figure 87: Number of transmissions for FloodToSink in posture
7
108, a example for posture 1 Walking), where pack-
ets will be re-sent several times according the links
quality. The fast increase of end-to-end delay in case
of original TreeBased strategy in postures 6 and 7
(see Figure 100 for example). That because the gen-
eral networks links quality are not good in posture 6
and 7 [27], the number of the retransmissions in these
two postures are important, which lead to important
collisions and backoffs with the increase of the pack-
ets generation rate. In general, BAN-GZKP has the
lower end-to-end delay and number of transmissions
in all the postures. In terms of ratio of packets re-
ception, in posture 1, 2, 4 and 7 (see Figure 88 for
example), both BAN-GZKP and BANZKP are sta-
ble, and BAN-ZKP is better than BANZKP. How-
ever in postures 3 and 5 (see Figure 90 for example),
BANZKP is better when the packets generation rate
is lower than 5 packets per second and 1 packet per
second for postures 3 and 5, respectively ; when the
packets generation rate is higher than 5 packets per
second and 1 packet per second for postures 3 and 5,
respectively, the performance of BANZKP decreases
fast. And in posture 6, see Figure 93, both BANZKP
and BAN-GZKP decrease fast when the packets gen-
eration rate is high. That is due to the retransmission
mechanism of the TreeBased strategy, which lead to a
high network burden. A flawed link not only lead to a
decrease of the ratio of packets reception, but also an
important number of retransmissions: that consumes
the networks resource. If flawed links appear at the
edge of the networks, like in postures 1,2 and 7 (see
[27]), a hop-by-hop BAN-GZKP will limit the waste
of the local retransmissions. But if the flawed links
appear close to the sink, like in postures 3, 5 and 6,
the BAN-GZKP could waste an important number
Figure 88: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 1
Figure 89: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 2
of transmissions, according to the analyze for strat-
egy APAP and CTP. For the end to end BANZKP,
the flawed links do not have an important influence.
The defects will be enlarged by the retransmission
mechanism of TreeBased strategy. The performance
of the BAN-GZKP has important variance in defects-
enlarged links (by retransmission mechanism) if links
defects occur close to the sink.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new ZKP-based se-
curity scheme specifically designed for WBAN net-
works. Our scheme, BAN-GZKP uses three ingre-
dients: a novel random key allocation which makes
it resilient to the replay attack and redundancy in-
formation crack, a hop-by-hop authentication scheme
which makes it resilient to DDoS attacks at sink and
a ZKP exchanging optimisation to further reduce the
number of transmissions. Our BAN-GZKP improves,
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Figure 90: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 3
Figure 91: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 4
Figure 92: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 5
Figure 93: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 6
Figure 94: Percentage of received messages for TreeBased in
posture 7
Figure 95: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 1
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Figure 96: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 2
Figure 97: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 3
Figure 98: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 4
Figure 99: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 5
Figure 100: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 6
Figure 101: End-To-End Delay for TreeBased in posture 7
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Figure 102: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
1
Figure 103: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
2
Figure 104: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
3
Figure 105: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
4
Figure 106: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
5
Figure 107: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
6
30
Figure 108: Number of transmissions for TreeBased in posture
7
without any additional cost, the security level of the
best ZKP scheme designed so far for WBAN net-
works. Moreover, when BAN-GZKP is used in order
to secure existing convergecast protocols their per-
formances are drastically improved compared to the
case when BANZKP is used.
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